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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CHRISTOPHER CANTWELL *

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL J. BARBADORO

Appearances:

For the Government: John S. Davis, AUSA

Anna Z. Krasinski, AUSA

United States Attorney's Office

For the Defendant: Eric Wolpin, Esq.

Jeffrey S. Levin, Esq. Federal Defender's Office

<u>Court Reporter</u>: Liza W. Dubois, RMR, CRR

Official Court Reporter

1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Hi, this is Judge Barbadoro. I'd ask my 3 case manager, do I have everybody on who needs to be on? 4 THE CLERK: You do, your Honor --5 MR. LEVIN: Jeff Levin and Eric Wolpin are on. THE CLERK: John Davis and Anna Krasinski are on as 6 7 well, your Honor. Everyone's here. 8 THE COURT: And do I have a court reporter? THE CLERK: You do, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: All right. Great. 10 11 So I understand that the government wants to conduct 12 the deposition of a government witness that would require 13 removing Mr. Cantwell from the jail and the parties traveling 14 out of state to take the deposition. Do I have that right? 15 MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. I quess the first question I 17 have is I met with you on Tuesday, if I'm remembering 18 correctly. Why -- why didn't you raise this with me then? 19 MS. KRASINSKI: Candidly, your Honor, I was hoping 20 to, but the call ended pretty abruptly because we had the 21 informant call scheduled after. And so it -- we just sort of 22 ran out of time and I was still trying to work out whether it 23 would even be logistically possible. 24 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I've got to tell you, I'm 25 quite disappointed. This has been extremely disruptive.

1 currently at a place where I have very limited Internet and 2 telephone access. I fortunately just happened to have a chance to log on and see that the motion had been filed. I have been, 3 4 at least in my mind and in my experience, devoting an 5 extraordinary amount of time in meeting with counsel for both sides as the case trial date nears in an effort to try to help 6 7 counsel prepare for trial because I recognize that this is a somewhat unusual case. 8 9 But I really do expect that counsel for both sides will work as hard as I am to try to make this process work and 10 11 I really would have expected to have heard from you during the 12 regular call. And I -- this is quite disruptive for me and I'm 13 not happy about it. 14 So you -- I've now expressed my unhappiness. 15 let's turn to the merits. 16 I -- I can't really understand from your motion 17 where -- where is this person who you want to depose? 18 MS. KRASINSKI: The -- the witness is in a suburb of St. Louis, your Honor. 19 20 THE COURT: All right. So you're going to say my 21 whole trial team, both sides, are going to get on a plane, 22 Cantwell is going to get on a plane with an FBI agent, you're 23 going to fly to St. Louis where there's a higher positivity 24 rate than we have here, conduct a deposition, and then come 25 back? Is that what you're telling me?

MS. KRASINSKI: That's how Rule 15 reads, your
Honor. If the --

THE COURT: Well, why are -- why are we not -- why are we not bringing her here? I don't understand this. You've told me she's pregnant. What else is there about it that tells me this is a -- such an extraordinary problem that I have to endanger the entire trial team, perhaps disrupt the entire trial schedule, to accommodate this one interest? Does she have some kind of preexisting condition that -- other than the fact that she's pregnant? I don't know how pregnant she is.

Tell me in more detail why you want this extraordinary form of relief that I have not ever had anybody ask me in the 28 years that I've been on the court.

MS. KRASINSKI: Your Honor, she, I believe, is -she's in the first trimester. We were not aware of the
pregnancy until very recently. She has informed us that she
has a history of miscarriages. At this point the data is
unclear as to whether or not a history of miscarriages would
impact what the CDC says is -- a woman who is pregnant is at a
higher risk of negative pregnancy outcomes, including preterm
birth.

So her doctor has advised her not to travel. She informed us of that and informed us of the history of miscarriages. But, again, there's insufficient data with COVID-19 and pregnancy at this point to know whether or not

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that history of miscarriages would place her at greater risk of
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     a negative pregnancy outcome if she were to contract COVID-19.
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                And --
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                THE COURT: I --
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                MS. KRASINSKI: -- Attorney Davis -- sorry?
                THE COURT: I -- I'm sorry. But are you aware of
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    data that suggests that -- that the risk of -- of -- being
     infected with COVID-19 does have an effect on negative outcomes
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    with pregnant women that's different from ordinary risks that
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    people face if they're infected by COVID-19?
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                MS. KRASINSKI: The CDC --
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                THE COURT: I haven't seen any of that data.
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                MS. KRASINSKI: The CDC has updated its guidelines
    to say that from what they can tell right now, there may --
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     they don't say definitively, but there may be an increased risk
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     of severe complications where a pregnant woman contracts
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    COVID-19 and that there may be an increased risk of negative
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    pregnancy outcomes, including preterm birth.
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                So the CDC guidelines say nay.
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                THE COURT: Okay. I guess my next question is why
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     shouldn't I order you guys to go out there tomorrow, get on a
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    plane, get this thing done, so that everybody can
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     self-quarantine and take negative tests in a way that satisfies
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    me that I'm conducting a safe trial and not delaying the trial?
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    Why -- why do I need to wait till the 16th, just because that's
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     when people are available?
                MS. KRASINSKI: I -- I think if doing it tomorrow
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    would give people sufficient time for the Court to feel safe
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     for everyone to appear on the 15th, I think that we could make
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     that work. I was trying to see if there was a day after jury
     selection --
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                THE COURT: Well, we can send one of you out
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     there --
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                MS. KRASINSKI: Yes.
                THE COURT: -- from each -- one from the defense
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     team, one from the government team, and the other defense
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     lawyer and government lawyer can conduct the jury selection.
    And then the ones that have gone out there can quarantine and
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    we should be -- well, I guess I still have to have Cantwell
     there, don't I, at the jury selection?
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                I mean, this is -- this is so frustrating for me to
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    be presented with this on such short notice.
                MS. KRASINSKI: I understand, your Honor. I -- I
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     think Attorney Davis and I were trying to come up with any
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    possible way to basically not ask for a continuance to May of
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     next year and I -- I really do apologize for the way that
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     this -- that I -- you know, I raised this with the Court and
    that I wasn't able to raise it on Tuesday.
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                THE COURT: All right. I -- it wasn't clear to me
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    what the defense's position is on your proposal.
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MR. LEVIN: We filed an objection, your Honor.
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     don't know if the Court has seen it, but we --
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                THE COURT:
                            I -- no, I have not seen it.
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                MR. LEVIN:
                            Oh, okay.
                            I have not seen it.
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                THE COURT:
                MR. LEVIN: Well, we filed a detailed objection.
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    don't believe that she's unavailable, which I think the
     government has the burden of showing she's unavailable, and
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    also her testimony isn't material. We -- you know, we object
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    to it.
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                And, also, the rule does require the defendant to be
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    present at the deposition as well, so he'd have to be moved
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     there tomorrow.
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                THE COURT: Right, that's what I -- I understand.
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     That's what I'm -- that much I do understand from reading the
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    government's motion. I did not know of your objection.
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                MR. LEVIN: We cited some cases as well that
    indicate that motions such as this made on the eve of trial,
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     there's no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant them.
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                THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I know, but I -- I'm not
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     into game-playing on either side to benefit or hurt either
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     side. I try to get the right thing done if there's a way to do
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     it. So I'm not going to just deny it out of spite. I -- I
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    want to try to find a way for both sides to have a fair and
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     safe trial and that's why I was talking to you multiple times
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before -- in the weeks prior to the trial to try to flush out
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    any of the issues like this that the parties, if they were
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    doing their job, should be able to foresee, raise with the
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    Court, and we can work it out in advance. And that's why I'm
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    expressing the frustration that I'm expressing.
                So I understand that you are objecting. Your view
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    is her testimony is not material. Your view is that she's not
    unavailable. Is that essentially what the bottom line is on
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    your -- and that I have discretion to deny because it's close
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    to the time of trial.
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                MR. LEVIN: Right. And we -- we also -- we're not
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    available to fly halfway across the country for a deposition.
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    We have other cases and we're busy getting ready for -- to try
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    this one.
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                THE COURT: Yeah.
                                   I understand. But what -- I
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    mean, we'll have to -- you'll have to be available when I
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    require you to be available. That's just the way things work.
                Okay. Tell me, Ms. Krasinski, what is this witness
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    supposed to testify to?
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                MS. KRASINSKI: So her testimony is relevant to the
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    cyberstalking count. She will testify basically the impact of
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    Mr. Cantwell posting pictures of her on the Radical Agenda
    Telegram, the public Telegram group, as well as Cantwell
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    calling CPS to try to break up her family.
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                Count Four, the cyberstalking statute, allows -- a
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person can violate that statute by acting with the specific intent to harass a person and engage in a course of conduct that causes or would reasonably be expected to cause distress to that person's spouse. And so her testimony is relevant to establishing whether or not his course of conduct, which included more than just the communications between Cantwell and Cheddar, Cheddar Mane, it -- you know, it included this call to Child Protective Services, it included posting pictures of her and her children in her home to this -- to this broader group, posting her address information under that, everything but the street number -- but the number of her house; her street, her town, her state.

And so her testimony is relevant to that count, to an essential element of that count.

THE COURT: Can I -- again, unfortunately, because I -- I think not unreasonably -- expected that the parties would bring issues that needed to be brought to my attention to my attention at the conference call I scheduled for that purpose, I do not have access to the materials that I would ordinarily have in front of me. So you need to answer this question for me.

I do not recall whether the cyberstalking count as charged identifies her as a person who -- whose reaction is an element of the -- of the charged offense. Can you refresh my memory on that?

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                MS. KRASINSKI: It does, your Honor. And I can read
     you the -- that portion of Count Four. Let me just turn to it
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     right now.
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                So this is on page 3 of docket 33, the superseding
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     indictment, of between in or about June 15th and June 17th,
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     2019, within the District of New Hampshire and elsewhere, the
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     defendant, Christopher C. Cantwell, with the intent to harass
     and intimidate Victim 1, did use facilities of interstate and
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     foreign commerce, including electronic communication services
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     and telephone facilities, to engage in a course of conduct that
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    placed Victim 1 in reasonable fear of serious bodily injury to
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    Victim 1's spouse and that caused, attempted to cause, and
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    would reasonably be expected to cause substantial emotional
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    distress to Victim 1 and Victim 1's spouse.
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                It then goes on to describe some of the course of
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     conduct.
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                THE COURT: All right. So you did identify the
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     spouse in the indictment as one of the people who the course of
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     conduct is affecting, right? So that's -- that's why you think
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     it's important to have her testify.
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                MS. KRASINSKI: Yes, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: All right. What's the defense say to
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    that?
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                MR. WOLPIN: That --
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                MR. LEVIN: I'm sorry. Was someone trying to speak?
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1 MR. WOLPIN: Yeah. Do you mind, Jeff? MR. LEVIN: Okay. Go ahead. 2 3 MR. WOLPIN: Okav. 4 Your Honor, the -- I think it's important to 5 understand some of the factual background of this. The communication occurred in June of last year. 6 7 Those communications were online, as the Court is aware, between Cheddar Mane and the defendant. Ms. Lambert had no 8 knowledge of that at the time. She doesn't learn about this 9 10 until four months later when the FBI shows up at her door and 11 sort of points this out to her as being in existence. So for 12 that entire four-month period, there's no communication or 13 interaction. She has no knowledge of this. 14 When the FBI interviews her in October, she says she doesn't know who Cheddar Mane is; she doesn't know who Chris 15 16 Cantwell is; she doesn't know who Vic Mackey is; she does not know about her husband's online activities or the extent to 17 which he has these views and had not learned about this until 18 19 the point at which the FBI brought it to her attention. 20 So to suggest that somehow four months later when the FBI comes knocking at the door saying your family's in 21 22 danger that she has a reaction, I don't see that as relevant. 23 That -- she was never actually part of this. She didn't know 24 about it at the time. And so to suddenly say that her reaction 25 four months later informs the jury of things that are relevant

I just think isn't the case. That is -- again, that's how her involvement comes about.

It would be something different if she had told the FBI that she was actually involved in this or knew about it or was made aware of it or her husband had reacted in a certain way, but he didn't tell her about it. She didn't know about it. This is a self-contained interaction between this online community that never ends up involving her until the FBI gets involved and sort of takes this approach of explaining to her what happened.

And so what I believe the government would present is her reaction some months later with no context of who my client is, of how this interaction occurs online, of what kind of words her husband says, and so I think it has no relevance in relation to what we're actually dealing with in this offense.

And, you know, I certainly don't know exactly what they are going to have her testify to, but my suspicion is to have her come in and say how horrible it was when she read it and that's how she felt when she -- when the FBI came to her without context and provided this to her. I simply think that is not relevant at this point and is -- is prejudicial in the sense that this certainly was never going to get to her but for the FBI's approach of her and Mr. Lambert never --

THE COURT: Can I interrupt, Mr. Wolpin --

1 MR. WOLPIN: Yes. 2 THE COURT: -- and ask you about the child and family services portion of this? 3 4 MR. WOLPIN: Yes. 5 THE COURT: I don't know the facts of the case. MR. WOLPIN: Yes. 6 7 THE COURT: And can you -- I imagine that there was -- what I'm understanding -- again, I don't have the 8 materials in front of me. I'm proceeding on a recollection 9 that may be imperfect. 10 11 I -- I thought there was some action actually taken 12 by Cantwell to notify child and family services. And did that 13 prompt some kind of interaction between child and family 14 services and Cheddar Mane's spouse? 15 MR. WOLPIN: The answer to the first part is yes, 16 there is a call that was made in June to CPS. That, according 17 to what the government has told us, did not result in any 18 interaction with the family. So she had no knowledge that that 19 had occurred, as far as I can tell, at the time in June or July or August or September until the FBI comes and tells her the 20 21 story of what happened. 22 So to my knowledge, no, she has no --23 THE COURT: So the -- so, again, just -- let me just interrupt you and confirm my understanding that it is your view 24 25 that the Cheddar Mane spouse had no awareness of this

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     communication until the FBI showed up at her door --
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                MR. LEVIN:
                            The CPS -- the CPS report?
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                THE COURT:
                            Any part of it. I -- not that the --
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                MR. LEVIN:
                            So the -- the real --
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                THE COURT:
                            Just let me -- just let me finish for a
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    minute, please.
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                MR. LEVIN:
                            Oh, sorry.
                THE COURT: Yeah.
                                   Okav.
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                I -- I am understanding Mr. Wolpin to be saying to
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    me that the Cheddar Mane spouse had absolutely no awareness of
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11
     anything that was happening in communications from Mr. Cantwell
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     to her husband about these alleged threats until the FBI showed
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     up at her door and made her aware of them. And I just want to
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    know if I'm understanding what I'm being told correctly,
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    Mr. Wolpin. Am I --
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                MR. WOLPIN: Yes. So I have --
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                THE COURT: Now, Mr. Levin --
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                MR. LEVIN:
                            Yeah. I just want to make a -- just to
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    make a caveat to that, which is that the report we received
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     said that she felt like, in quotes, someone may have mentioned
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     the CPS threat to her, but she was not sure.
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                So that was the extent of whether or not she was
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    aware that Cantwell had called Missouri Child Protective
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     Services to make a report and that was a -- during a later
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     interview. They asked her if she was aware, prior to speaking
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with the FBI in October, that Cantwell had called CPS and she said she felt like someone may have mentioned it to her, but she was not sure.

THE COURT: And -- okay.

MR. WOLPIN: As far as the October interview, the language from the 302 is she was asked if she was aware of any online activity or any groups that Cheddar Mane may be a part of; she was aware of his beliefs, she was not aware of the content of his online activity or to what extent his beliefs are, she has not heard the names Chris Cantwell, Vic Mackey, or Cheddar Mane before, and she -- and it goes from there.

So --

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.

Let me ask the government to simply tell me, do you agree with what I am understanding, which is if the -- the Cheddar Mane's spouse were called as a witness to testify about the impact of this communication on her, her testimony would be essentially it had no impact on me until the FBI showed up and made me aware of it; is that right?

MS. KRASINSKI: I don't think so. I think she would say that she thinks her husband told her about a potential CPS call before the -- before the FBI showed up at her door.

I agree that she did not know about the words exchanged between Mr. Cantwell and her husband. She did not know about those.

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Sort of the only other thing I would mention is that
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    the photographs and the address -- I mean, the last time the
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    FBI checked, those are still up and available in Telegram from
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    when Cantwell posted them. So he may have posted them in June
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    of 2019, but the impact to her is ongoing. That information is
    up, it is out, it is available, it is public. It remains
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 7
    public. So the --
                THE COURT: I don't think -- excuse me, Counsel.
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    don't in any way mean to suggest that these kinds of
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    communications are not painful for those that become aware of
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    them when the -- when they're aimed at them and they become
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    aware of them, whenever they become aware of them. Years
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    later, it's painful. And I certainly understand to the extent
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    you are telling me that these communications still exist in the
15
    online world and still have the capacity to injure Mr. -- or
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    Cheddar Mane's spouse. I -- I'm not in any way trying to
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    minimize that. I'm just not sure how that has a bearing on the
    element of a cyberstalking charge. And so that -- help me
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    connect what you're saying --
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                MS. KRASINSKI: So I'm not talking --
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                THE COURT: -- to the extent you're telling -- I've
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    got -- just let me finish.
                To the extent that what you're telling me is, yeah,
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    Judge, even if she never heard of it until the FBI showed up at
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    her door, the fact that those are online now means that the
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crime is ongoing and she can be able to testify about it even if she only found out about it last week. That -- that doesn't -- again, unfortunately, because of the circumstances in which this has been raised with me, I don't have any access to the actual documents to be able to study the problem. I'm trying to work as efficiently as I can, given the limited resources that I have available to me.

But am I understanding -- is that what your position is, that you need her -- you're going to have her testify that my husband may have made some reference to me, I'm not sure what, about a possible CPS call; but there will be no evidence that CPS ever contacted her, there will be no evidence that she knew about the communications in any kind of detail other than that prior to the time the FBI showed up at her door, and what she's going to be primarily testifying to is how it affected her when the FBI told her about what Mr. Cantwell had said.

Is that basically why you're calling her?

MS. KRASINSKI: No. And I want to be clear. There are sort of distinct categories of postings. There's the communications themselves, which I'm kind of separating out right now.

After the actual communication between Mr. Cantwell and Cheddar, Mr. Cantwell went on to the Radical Agenda chat group with over 200 members and in that group he publicly posted photographs of this woman and her children. He -- and

in a way that it -- it is still readily available.

you.

he posted essentially her address, everything but the number of her house. He posted the street, he posted the town, he posted the state.

And what Mr. Cantwell publicly posted, not -- not the communications, but this public posting, he put up in a --

And so for that, I think that's separate than the communications between Cantwell and her husband because this public posting of her, anyone could have called her about that, right? I mean, not just the FBI. Someone else could have said, hey, look, here you are with your kids in this -- in this Radical Agenda Telegram group with 290-something --

THE COURT: Let me stop you --

MS. KRASINSKI: -- listeners.

THE COURT: Let me stop you. Okay. Let me stop

Part of the reason that this is so unpleasant and frustrating for me is I don't have available my copy of the indictment, my copy of the statute, and so I am trying to parse a statute that I've never had to deal with in court before — that I have looked at, that I have done research on, that I prepared extensively to discuss with you at the last telephone conference where I had those materials available, but I don't have them available to me now. So I'm proceeding with very limited resources to try to analyze this problem.

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My recollection is that the -- and, now, you -- you
tell me what the elements of the cyberstalking charge are that
you have brought as they apply to the -- Mr. Cantwell's spouse
here. Is it the subjective reaction of the victim that's
relevant? Is it what a reasonable person understanding the
communication to be that is relevant? What is the -- what is
the test here for the element that you're trying to get at by
having her testify?
           MS. KRASINSKI: So the jury instruction, based on
Judge Laplante's instruction in United States vs. Ackell, is:
In order for you to find that the defendant engaged in a course
of conduct that would reasonably be expected to cause emotional
distress, the United States must prove that the course of
conduct would have caused substantial emotional distress to a
reasonable person.
           THE COURT: Yeah. So it's not the subjective -- you
don't need to prove the subjective response of the spouse of
Victim 1 to prove your charge, right? It's what a reasonable
person would understand that the nature of the communication
would be.
           MS. KRASINSKI: That's one prong. Another method of
proving it is that it actually caused substantial emotional
distress to her --
           THE COURT: That's what I'm asking.
                                                I had a
recollection --
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                MS. KRASINSKI: I'm sorry.
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                THE COURT: -- that it was an unusual statute in
     that it could be proved by either it provoked a subjective
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     response -- a response or it would reasonably be understood.
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    And you're telling me --
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                MS. KRASINKSI: Yes.
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                THE COURT: -- you're going to -- your instruction
    proceeds under both of those prongs.
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                MS. KRASINSKI: Yes.
                THE COURT: All right. Read me the proposed
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     instruction that deals with the subjective part of it.
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                MS. KRASINSKI: So that is: In order for you to
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     find the defendant guilty of the chime charged in Count Four,
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    you must unanimously agree that the United States has proven
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     one of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: That the
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    defendant's course of conduct actually caused, attempted to
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     cause -- although we -- we talked about that, that that may not
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    be appropriate -- or would reasonably be expected to cause
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     substantial emotional distress to either the victim or his
20
     spouse.
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                THE COURT: Okay. Now, is your -- is it your
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    position that the crime could be committed even if the
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     "actually caused" occurs as a result of the FBI making the
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    victim aware of the threat after it occurs?
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                MS. KRASINSKI: So I think that --
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THE COURT: Do you see the problem with that? It's almost like then the FBI can complete a crime that otherwise would never have been committed because they go to the victim, make the victim aware of it, the victim actually becomes -- has the emotional reaction that's necessary, and that is how the crime gets committed. That strikes me as a problematic way in which a defendant can be convicted of a crime.

In other words, if it doesn't meet the reasonable test but it meets the subjective test, but the subjective test -- the crime is satisfied only because the FBI goes and shows the victim the reaction and -- the communication and says, how do you react to that, that -- and that's what you're getting at here, you want to try to satisfy the subjective element by calling her to get her to say, when the FBI told me about this, I was extremely upset.

MS. KRASINSKI: So I don't think that we intend to discuss with her the contents of the communications between Cantwell and Cheddar directly, the -- if you don't want me to come and F your wife in front of your kids. And I think if it were only those communications -- I think if the course of conduct was limited to Cantwell saying things to her husband, I think that would be correct, that if she becomes aware of it by the FBI that her testimony probably wouldn't be relevant.

The difference is the posting of the public pictures and the actual calling CPS. Both of those actions, I would

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argue, Cantwell engaged in with the purpose and expectation that she would be impacted by it. I think she would testify that, you know, she -- she -- her husband may have mentioned the CPS thing and what she thought was, well, I don't think any investigation would result in my kids being taken away from me, but I certainly don't welcome the intrusion into my life. And I think the fact that Cantwell publicly posted pictures of her, that this is his action that are still available, I think the fact that he has publicly posted them in a way that still has the potential to impact her life that her testimony on those points is relevant because those relate directly to Cantwell's activity towards her. THE COURT: Okay. A brief response from the defendant and then we'll wrap up on this particular issue. MR. LEVIN: Your Honor --Do you want to say anything else? THE COURT: MR. LEVIN: I'm sorry. Just that materiality is not just relevance, it's super -- super relevance in the context of a Rule 15 deposition. We don't believe the testimony is even relevant. In fact, we filed a motion in limine on this point to prevent the testimony that's still outstanding. It's --THE COURT: Could you -- could you read me the text of Rule 15, please, again? I'm not -- I'm acting without any ability to do the ordinary kind of legal research and analysis that I'm required to do generally. So please read me the text

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     of Rule 15.
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                MR. LEVIN: Okay. It says -- I'm sorry. I have to
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    pull it up here.
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                A party may move -- this is when -- there's --
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     there's multiple parts. There's when taken -- it says: A
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    party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in order
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     to preserve testimony for trial. The Court may grant the
    motion because of exceptional circumstances and any interest of
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    justice. If the Court orders the deposition to be taken, it
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    may also require the deponent to produce certain materials.
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                And then it says notice -- you have to have
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     reasonable written notice of the date and location, the name
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    and address of each deponent, and defendant's presence is
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     required.
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                Then there's a --
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                THE COURT: What portion of the -- what portion of
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     the rule leads you to the -- what you call a super materiality
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     requirement?
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                MR. LEVIN: Well, it's in case law and we -- we
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     cited various cases in our --
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                THE COURT: Yeah. So you understand I don't have
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     the -- your objection, so now's your chance to make me aware of
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     it. So tell me what the case law tells me -- tells me about
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     super materiality.
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                MR. LEVIN: We cited a case called United States vs.
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     Drogoul, D-r-o-q-o-u-l, 1F.3d 1546. Testimony is material if
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     it is highly relevant to a central issue in the case.
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    burden of proof rests with the movant to demonstrate the
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    necessity for preserving prospective witnesses' testimony by a
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    deposition. That's the Ismaili case, 828 F.2d 153, a Third
    Circuit case. It talks about -- Ismaili talks about testimony
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     that negates the crux of the government's case as material, 828
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    161.
                And then United States vs. Al Fawwaz, which was a
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     Southern District of New York case, a district court case from
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     2014: It need not be definitive proof of guilt or innocence,
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    but should be more than merely relevant.
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                Those are the -- those are the --
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                THE COURT: Okay.
                            -- the cases.
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                MR. LEVIN:
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                THE COURT: I'm not sure where that -- I don't find
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     it in the text of the rule that you've read to me anything that
    allows me to impose a -- a super relevancy requirement before
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     allowing a deposition, but I do think the test for
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     admissibility of evidence isn't restricted just to a Rule 401
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     relevancy analysis and instead, ultimately, a Rule 403 analysis
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     can -- a judge can consider a variety of factors, such as the
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     cumulativeness or the burdensomeness of producing the evidence
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    when deciding whether the evidence comes in.
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                I -- I -- I want to give the government one last
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chance to respond because this is -- my initial reaction to all of this is, unfortunately, this is being brought to my attention very late in the game at a time where I have a limited capacity to conduct my own research of the -- of the problem and I do really need to give you an answer on an expedited basis.

But, second, based on what I've heard, it sounds like if this witness does not testify, it will impair your ability to prove your case in any significant way. The communications are what they are. Your arguments I think are powerful arguments about how a reasonable person would perceive these kinds of communications. And I -- you're free to make all of those arguments whether this particular person testifies or not. I understand there might be additional -- an emotional component to her testimony when she delivers it directly to the jury about how upsetting this is and I'm assuming -- I obviously don't know what she would say, but I'm assuming if you want to call her it's because she wants to tell the jury how upsetting it is to have learned about these communications.

But where she's learned about them because the FBI show up at her door long after the communications occur, I -- it raises questions about whether that kind of testimony should even be allowed to determine the subjective component of the -- of the crime and diminishes its usefulness when making arguments about the objective component.

Mr. Cantwell's going to testify. He can testify as to his reaction to the communications. The communications will be in front of the jury. The government will have full right to argue about how a reasonable person would perceive those communications.

I'm not sure -- given the extraordinary problems that doing what you're asking me to order the parties to do here would cause, I'm just not seeing how this extraordinary relief you're requesting at a very late stage in the proceeding can be justified.

So what do you want to tell me, Counsel, in response to what we've been discussing?

MS. KRASINSKI: So I think there are a couple important things. The first is that it's not learning about the communications between Cantwell and her husband that she's -- I mean, I think those certainly were upsetting to her, but I don't think that's the issue.

I think the issue is, for her, the fact -- the fact that Cantwell publicly, separate from his communications with Cheddar, the fact that he publicly posted her photographs and address in a way that is permanently and publicly accessible in this group that she does not want any part of, this Radical Agenda Telegram group that she doesn't want to be a member of, I think that is distinct from the private communications with Cantwell and her husband and there are -- there's not much case

law on that. The only cases that I could find even sort of remotely on point deal with essentially whether or not an indictment should be dismissed based on multiplicity and I -- I only found two cases that even sort of deal with this at all, both district court cases, one, *United States vs. Moreland*, M-o-r-e-l-a-n-d, 272 F.Supp. 3d 1222, and that's the Northern District of Oklahoma, 2016.

And in that case, that's kind of similar to what you're talking about, your Honor, where someone emails a victim hundreds of times and that was it and then the victim actually forwarded one of those emails to a family member. And what the Court in *Moreland* said was, well, look, the defendant didn't do that, so we agree that dismissal is appropriate here.

But separate and distinct from that there's a Southern District of Georgia case from 2019, and that's *United States vs. Oury*, O-u-r-y, 2019 Westlaw 8440692, that makes a distinction where the defendant engaged in conduct that is directly targeted at the -- at this third person, so where the defendant drove past the victim's parents' house, where the defendant engaged in conduct that was purposely directed at the victim's parents.

So here I think if it was just the communication between Cantwell and this -- and her husband, I think we'd be in a different boat and I don't think I -- I -- I think her testimony would not be that relevant. But where Cantwell took

separate steps apart from that in a -- and that Cantwell's actions have put her pictures and her address forever publicly available, it's his actions that caused the emotional distress on that part, not the communications on -- on his conduct of posting her photographs, her children, and her address publicly. And I think that's distinct.

THE COURT: Okav. I -- I think I fully understand.

THE COURT: Okay. I -- I think I fully understand.

Again, she became aware of those public postings from the FBI making her aware of that; is that right?

MS. KRASINSKI: I think she did. I think she knew of a CPS call separate from, before the FBI, but I think she became aware of -- that Cantwell posted these pictures of her and that they continued to be available later.

THE COURT: And I -- I'm very reluctant to rule on this issue without undertaking the normal approach to resolving legal problems that come up that I follow in my work, but I'm feeling that we are facing some significant time pressure to get a ruling from me on this because we need to have this matter resolved in a way that does not delay the trial and that does not expose people who attend the trial to an undue risk of infection.

And I -- what the -- the government is proposing to me is either a practice that deviates from the agreed-upon quarantining and testing protocol which we have agreed upon in this case and which the Court has followed in the first case

that it tried and that we developed in consultation with the 1 2 judges and a retained expert. And I'm very reluctant to deviate from that, that quarantining and testing protocol, and 3 4 I'm not seeing how we can comply with that quarantining and 5 testing protocol without delaying the trial if I'm to go with 6 your proposal. 7 Do you have a solution that allows compliance with the quarantining and testing protocol that does not delay the 8 9 trial? 10 MS. KRASINSKI: So I think if this occurs on the 11 16th, it -- and one attorney traveled, it would allow the 12 attorney that traveled, if they came back the day of, to quarantine and test. 13 14 I -- I -- I understand the -- I mean, it's --15 COVID-19 is the reason that we even filed this and so I 16 certainly understand the Court's hesitation here. 17 The one thing I would ask is that, you know, I 18 certainly understand that the Court is considering whether or 19 not it wants to allow her testimony at all in determining 20 whether or not to grant this motion. If the Court is concerned 21 with the quarantine requirement, I -- you know, we wouldn't --22 THE COURT: In truth, the least risky thing that she 23 could do for herself would be to get in a car right now and --24 with her husband and drive to New Hampshire and stay in an

Airbnb in New Hampshire until the trial's over. We have a

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prevalence rate in this state that is vastly lower than it is in the state that she's currently residing at. She would have minimal exposure to the virus if she got in a car and drove.

It's unclear to me what the risks -- added risks are to an otherwise healthy young person in the first trimester of pregnancy anyway, but the procedure you're proposing exposes multiple additional people to added risk of coronavirus. And that isn't just you; it's the defense lawyer, it's

Mr. Cantwell, I assume the jail will have to quarantine him for the entire time that the trial -- leading up to the trial, but he still is going to end up getting in a van with a driver every day back and forth to court and by releasing him in the custody of an FBI agent, they have to get on a plane and go out to the place where the victim's spouse is.

So it substantially changes the risk calculation that we are using when we decide that we can, with sufficient safety, conduct a trial. And, you know, that's, in part, why I talked to you multiple times about is everybody okay on the compliance with our quarantining and testing protocol, what contract do you have in place for testing of your witnesses, is the defense ready with having his witnesses testify -- tested. These are -- these are things that we tried really hard to make parties aware of, work with parties well in advance of the trials. They're not simple things to conduct. And this is extraordinary problematic.

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So -- but I don't see how I can really wait much longer. I really am not inclined to delay the trial because I've already submitted a jury questionnaire to the panel advising them about the dates in which we'll be conducting the trial and it will -- it will potentially require disqualification of other jurors if we move the -- the date for taking of evidence in the trial. So I -- I don't consider continuing the trial to be, really, a viable option here. MS. KRASINSKI: Then I would --THE COURT: Go ahead. MS. KRASINSKI: You know, I -- I understand all of the Court's concerns. You know, obviously we are trying to do this in a way that respects Mr. Cantwell's rights under Rule 15 because it is ultimately up to him whether he would attend. But I would just ask if the Court is -- you know, doesn't want to grant the deposition in light of COVID-19 risk, I absolutely appreciate and understand that, but I would ask that before ruling on whether or not to exclude her testimony the Court allow the government time to work with her to see if either we would just not call her or if she would ultimately, over her physician's counsel, travel. I don't know that we can make that call for her, but it would certainly be something we'd like to discuss with her if the Court is not inclined to grant the motion for deposition.

THE COURT: Yeah. I'm not ruling on admissibility of her testimony, but I am considering the -- not just whether the testimony meets the minimal threshold of relevance, which it -- it appears to do in certain respects, but whether given the risks that it poses to our ability to conduct a trial if I'm to accommodate the government in the way the government wants me to accommodate it with respect to authorizing the Rule 15 deposition, I -- I need to consider how that affects my ability to conduct the trial on the schedule that we've set, to conduct the trial safely.

And when the witness has information to provide that meets the minimal threshold of relevancy but isn't essential to the government's ability to prove its case, that can -- it seems to me -- again, I, unfortunately, I have not had a chance to study the case law on this, but it seems to be entirely appropriate to consider those kinds of impacts when evaluating a request to allow a deposition. So how important the witness's testimony is should be a consideration in determining whether to grant the motion. So I'm -- I'm evaluating it for that reason, not to determine whether it meets the minimal threshold of relevancy or whether it should be excluded under 403 as a waste of time.

If she were -- if she were in New Hampshire, able to comply with our quarantine protocols and you wanted to call her as a witness, that would be a simple Rule 401, Rule 403

calculation. I've already suggested it appears to easily satisfy the Rule 401 standard.

The Rule 403 criteria are completely different, but I don't have to worry about, well, if I call her, it's going to delay the trial; if I call her, she's going to increase the risk that I'll have to stop the trial because one or more people will become infected with COVID during the trial because she hasn't complied with the quarantine procedures that we've agreed on or that other people who have traveled out to take her deposition are no longer complying with the quarantine procedures that we agreed upon.

So that's why I'm considering it. So I -- don't worry. I'm not saying she can't testify at all. The defense certainly has a right to try to move to bar her testimony.

There's a motion in limine apparently that's been filed to that effect. But I -- I don't have to rule on that until you try to call her as a witness, so ...

All right. Well, I -- I understand. I think I understand both parties' arguments here. And I just want to be very clear at the outset here, and I hope you accept this as being a statement by me made in utmost good faith. I would never rule against a party on any issue because I'm dissatisfied with the way in which the party raised the issue with me.

So, Ms. Krasinski, I'm frustrated that I didn't have

this in front of me at a time when I could analyze it in a way that I ordinarily analyze problems, but that has nothing to do with whether I grant or deny the motion. It's not -- I'm not ruling on this matter as a matter of personal pique, you know, that I have some kind of anger and I'm just ruling to punish someone. That has nothing to do with my analysis of the issue.

But I am going to deny the government's motion, and let me explain my reasons. And I've alluded to them during the course of our discussion here.

First, it is important to me that this request is being made at a very late date in the trial process, after the last scheduled telephone conference with the parties that I arranged to discuss issues of this sort with the parties prior to my leaving the court for a few days to be away from the court for the first time in about 15 or 16 months. And I -- I am now hearing this matter at a time when I'm away from the court, when I have very limited Internet access, very limited telephonic access, no ability to have in front of me the case law that the parties are citing to me, no ability to analyze the statutes and the rules that we've been discussing except in the way that I'm trying to do it here.

And that is important to me, that this request is coming to me at a late date. A later than -- it could have raised with me -- it could have been raised with me at a time when I would have had a greater opportunity to act. So that's

important to me in my analysis, not because I'm frustrated with the government's conduct, but because it has an effect on my ability to analyze the issue the way I want to analyze it and it could have been raised with me at an earlier period of time.

More fundamentally here, the motion places me in a very difficult position. We have tried to give the government and defendant the right to have a trial, a speedy trial, in an environment in which the people coming into the courthouse are placed at risk of infection with the -- with the coronavirus and we have very carefully, in consultation with an expert, developed protocols that are designed to satisfy the government and the defendant's interest in a speedy trial while minimizing the risk to members of the public that we bring into the courthouse against their will to serve on juries and to be testifying as witnesses. And we developed those protocols very carefully to make sure that we can conduct this trial as safely as possible.

The government -- the government's proposal requires me to deviate from those protocols that have been carefully developed or it requires me to continue the trial. Continuing the trial is problematic because I've already sent a questionnaire to the jurors informing them of when we would be holding the trial and it will complicate our ability to conduct the trial if I am to delay it beyond the dates that we agreed to several weeks ago. And so the -- I'm placed in a position

where either I have to compromise our -- our safety protocols or I have to delay the trial. Neither of those options is a good one.

And so to justify doing what the government wants really requires a very strong reason why I should increase the risk to the public by not complying with our quarantining procedures or complicate our ability to try the case by delaying the trial. And here I just don't see there is a sufficient justification offered by the government for the extraordinarily -- extraordinary relief it is requesting.

I have tried to listen carefully to the government's proffer as to what the witness would testify to. I agree that she has relevant testimony to provide, but that testimony does not strike me as in any way essential to the government's ability to prove its case and, indeed, it seems to be of much lesser relevance than other evidence that the government will rely on, such as testimony from Cheddar Mane. Almost every argument that the government wants to present that I'm aware of can be fully presented to the jury whether this witness testifies or not.

And so -- and then, finally, I would note that it is by no means apparent to me that requiring this witness to travel by automobile to New Hampshire places her at any greater risk than she would face staying home where she is. On the other hand, requiring a large group of people, including an

1 incarcerated defendant, to travel to her increases the risk 2 significantly that others will become infected. 3 And so I'm not satisfied that from a pure risk 4 reduction standpoint that the government's proposal is a 5 superior proposal to what seems to me to be another available alternative, that is for her to safely travel to New Hampshire 6 7 by automobile and to remain here in a state which has one of the lower prevalence rates in the United States for a 8 9 sufficient time to comply with our quarantine and testing 10 protocol. 11 And so for all of those reasons, I don't believe 12 on balance that the government has prevailed and I deny for 13 that reason -- and, of course, I do so without prejudice to the 14 government's right to seek to call the witness if she is 15 willing to come to New Hampshire and testify. 16 Is there -- anyone else need me to say anything else 17 about that particular issue? There's one more issue on the 18 table I need to talk to you about, but does anyone want to say 19 anything more about that particular issue? 20 MS. KRASINSKI: No, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Anything from the defense? 22 MR. LEVIN: No, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. So that -- that motion is

Now, there's another problem with another witness

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denied.

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     the government has filed and that appears to be a witness who
     is not communicating with the government, according to the
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     government, because she's been told not to communicate with the
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    government by the defendant.
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                Is that -- is it that the -- is that --
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    Ms. Krasinski, is that what the problem is?
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                MS. KRASINSKI: So my only concern is whether or not
     I can tell the Court whether or not she's complied with
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    quarantine requirements. And, actually, this morning she
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    called and said that she had seen a copy of our notice and has
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    a call I think scheduled with our victim/witness coordinator
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     this afternoon, so I'm hopeful that we'll be able to resolve
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     that issue.
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                THE COURT: All right. Well --
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                MR. LEVIN: We received correspondence from her
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     indicating that she's been trying to reach both the court the
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    U.S. Attorney's Office.
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                THE COURT: I don't know what she -- I've not been
    made aware of any efforts on her part to communicate with the
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     court.
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                I'd ask my case manager: Are you aware that this
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    person has been trying to communicate with the court?
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                THE CLERK: She called me today, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Oh, she did. Okay. Can you tell me
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    what -- as best you can, what was the nature of the
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1 communication you had with her? 2 THE CLERK: She called and said she was trying to 3 get in touch with the victim/witness coordinator at the U.S. 4 Attorney's Office and that she did not -- that he had been 5 trying for several days and was unable to do so. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 I gave her the phone number and email THE CLERK: 8 address. 9 THE COURT: All right. So, Ms. Krasinski, you think that she is going to talk to the coordinator this afternoon? 10 11 MS. KRASINSKI: I think they spoke briefly this 12 morning and that they are going to -- they scheduled a call for 13 this afternoon and I'm hopeful that that occurred. The last 14 time they had something scheduled, she sent an email saying 15 that she wasn't going to communicate with us. 16 So I'm -- I'm hopeful that we can all get on the 17 same page just about being able to discuss with her whether or 18 not she is complying with the court's quarantine requirement. But that's it. You know, she has an absolute right not to 19 20 speak to us or meet with us before trial and I don't have any 21 issue with that. My concern is simply making sure I can 22 represent to the Court that she's complied with those 23 quarantine requirements. I'm hopeful now that we'll be able to 24 do that. 25 THE COURT: Do you have her under subpoena?

MS. KRASINSKI: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Because I am going to want to ensure that our witnesses have complied with the quarantine requirements. If after this communication you have doubt about whether she is willing to do that, it would seem to me the next step would be for you to seek a warrant for her detention as a material witness and then we can hold her in quarantine for the required period so that she can testify safely.

I -- those are not measures that I would resort to lightly, but I want this trial to be conducted and it's going to be conducted in a way that's safe. And it -- it -- I don't know what -- if you've given any thought to that, but one thing to do is subpoena her for the first day of trial, subpoena her to come here for jury selection, and require her to remain here until the -- we're ready to have her testify.

Another -- another way to do that would be to seek a warrant for her arrest as a material witness and we could -- I would consider whether I need to have her detained until she can testify. We're not going to fool around with this. People are going to comply with whatever orders or you can ask me to issue an order ordering her to do it under pains of contempt if she does not.

So there are -- those at least are three options that strike me as available options to the Court. I would like your -- your thoughts and the defense's thoughts about that.

MS. KRASINSKI: I -- I would -- I would like to wait and see what happens with this call with the victim/witness coordinator this afternoon. You know, seeking a warrant for her would be my absolute last resort. I would hate to have to do that. So I'm hopeful that this issue can be resolved now, but if not, we'll alert the Court.

MR. WOLPIN: Yeah, I don't think there is an issue.

I mean, she emailed -- she cc'd us on the email as well

explaining her understanding of the quarantine and how many

days she would have to be quarantined, that she'd been trying

to leave messages with the government, that she'd called the

court leaving messages, and she would need a plane ticket.

THE COURT: All right. And defense response?

So I don't think we have a foundation at this point that she's noncompliant or noncooperative. And as -- you know, I'd just like to address they noted in their motion I did advise her to -- the only advice I thought I could give her -- which was to contact the party who subpoenaed you for those arrangements.

I had, at the government's request, reached out to her again to see if she was represented by counsel so there was someone who could advise her if it was heading toward the direction of do I have to comply or not have to comply with court orders. I felt that was beyond what I could get into with her.

So we've made the effort and then she indicated this morning that she was making the effort as well. So I think it's little premature to suggest that she's sort of drawing a line in the sand or saying she's not going to cooperate with them as far as quarantine requirements.

MS. KRASINSKI: And I just want to be clear. My understanding of the quarantine requirement is a five-day quarantine and test if she were to drive. If she flies on a commercial flight, I think that requires a 14-day quarantine period.

Do I have that -- am I understanding that correctly, or if she flies a commercial flight that she --

THE COURT: I don't have access to the specific protocol. You can contact the chief deputy clerk. She's extraordinarily knowledgeable about these matters. Any questions you have about the quarantining protocol she can answer.

I just want the parties to understand I'm serious about this. Okay? We're conducting this trial, we're conducting it on time, we're conducting it in as safe a way as we can, consistent with the carefully developed procedures that we are implementing for these trials, and I expect the parties to ensure that there has been compliance.

And if someone is -- has been -- if the parties are unable to assure the Court that there has been compliance, the

parties should notify me and my -- my case manager should track me down immediately if there is any kind of filing to that effect and we will consider what these options are. And certainly one option is to give a person who doesn't want to comply with the protocols the opportunity to challenge them.

And I'm happy to appoint counsel and give that person an opportunity to challenge.

What I'm not prepared to do is have these issues be unresolved heading into the trial. And if people are not responding, which is what I was presented with in the filing -- just not that they've been trying to contact people but that they weren't going to talk to the government. That's the impression I was given in the filing that was made to me -- I -- we're not going to fool around with that. Okay? People need to comply or they need to tell the Court, I don't think I should have to comply. And if they don't think they have to comply, I can appoint counsel for them and they can come in and we can address this in a -- in the ordinary fashion.

But if they are not willing to communicate with the Court, then we may have to resort to the use of judicial power to compel them. And I am willing to use that power as necessary, but I -- I don't do it lightly and I certainly wouldn't do it if someone is trying to comply or trying to determine what their obligations are.

And so I -- it sounds like the situation has

1 developed from the time the government filed its initial motion 2 with me, but if that should change, you need to let me know 3 right away because I need to get some means of communicating 4 with that person, I need to perhaps issue orders, I need to 5 perhaps issue warrants, I need to perhaps appoint counsel. 6 There are a variety of things I may need to do. 7 So let's hope that you're successful in resolving this matter in the way it should be resolved, but if you are 8 9 not, let my case manager know immediately. My case manager 10 will let me know immediately and we will get another telephone 11 conference and figure out what to do. But it's not going to be 12 an option to just sort of let things go until the time of 13 trial. Okay? 14 Anything --MS. KRASINSKI: Your Honor, can I --15 16 THE COURT: Anyone want to say anything else about 17 this particular issue? Yes, go ahead. 18 MS. KRASINSKI: I just want to make sure the record is clear on this, and it doesn't impact anything since she has 19 20 contacted us today. 21 I know she has said in an email that she has been 22 attempting to contact us. We have no record of even an attempt 23 at contact since September 4th. So I know she had said that. 24 I just want to make sure the record's clear on that because the 25 victim/witness coordinator, you know, works very hard to

respond to people when they call. So I just want to make sure that's clear. It's of no matter since she has contacted our office today.

So the only other issue that I want to raise with the Court is something that just happened last night. I have a

the Court is something that just happened last night. I have a family emergency that just happened. I would like to travel to New York for it. I would drive in a personal vehicle, I would go and then I would come back. I would quarantine for five days and test. I understand that it would mean I would miss jury selection, but --

THE COURT: Well --

MS. KRASINSKI: -- assuming a negative test, I
should --

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, let me just stop you. So I'm sorry that you have your emergency. We want to try to accommodate you if we can.

Are you -- and I don't need to know the details of the emergency, but New York has -- it depends on where you are in New York, but New York is among the lowest prevalent state in the country right now with a positivity rate -- test positivity rate of below 1. I was in New York for a couple hours ten -- about eight or nine days ago. I don't have any problem with you traveling to New York and, frankly, I don't -- I'm not even concerned about a need to quarantine as long as while you were there you were maintaining social distancing,

meeting with people outdoors, not being in rooms with people that you -- whose COVID status you don't know.

Are you going to be able to do that or are you going to have to be physically present indoors for extended periods of time with people who -- with whom you are not currently exposing yourself to on a regular basis?

MS. KRASINSKI: I would need to be indoors with someone who has been homebound for, you know, about a year, so who has been essentially socially isolating this whole time. You know, she has no indications of COVID-19 and hasn't been in contact with anyone because she's homebound.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. KRASINSKI: It would be driving there, seeing her, driving back. I would be masked the whole time. I could certainly ask the one other family member who would be present to wear a mask. I don't even need to stay for an extended period of time.

THE COURT: It -- is it New York City or where in New York is it?

MS. KRASINSKI: Westchester County, New Rochelle.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. So, again, there were times when -- that New Rochelle had a very high prevalence rate. It doesn't now. And I -- I mean, I -- of course, attend to the emergency. That -- it's good that we have two lawyers on the case and we'll do whatever we need to do. And if you

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need to be absent for jury selection, that's fine with me.
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     can show up halfway through the trial, as far as I'm concerned.
    Mr. Davis is a very able prosecutor and more than able to
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    handle whatever he needs to handle in your absence.
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                So, again, I'm really sorry that you face this
    problem and of course you should attend to it and you should
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     keep in communication with the court. But this is a -- a
     relatively low risk event that I'm confident you can attend to
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    and with -- usually -- the information I have is that 80 or
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     90 percent of cases in which symptoms develop, they develop
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    within five days of exposure. The 14-day period is an out --
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     outside limit on transmissibility. Transmissibility really
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     tends to occur relatively early on in the -- after exposure and
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    we are quite confident that in those cases, a five-day
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     quarantine and a negative test is -- leaves you at
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     substantially reduced risk of transmitting the disease.
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                So I know you'll be careful. I know you'll follow
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    as many of the social distancing and mask wearing and proper
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    ventilation guidelines as you can. And when you come back, you
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     can test -- you can quarantine for five days and take a
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     negative test and you should be good to go.
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                So you might miss the jury selection, but you should
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    be fine for the trial, right?
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                MS. KRASINSKI: Right.
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                THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. So -- and, Mr. Davis, are
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    you on the line?
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                MR. DAVIS: Yes, I am, Judge, and that's fine.
 3
                THE COURT: You can handle the jury selection,
 4
    right? You've done probably a hundred trials. You can do --
 5
    you can do this without Ms. Krasinski's able assistance.
                All right. So that's fine.
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 7
                MR. DAVIS: She will be greatly missed, your Honor,
    but yes.
 8
 9
                MS. KRASINSKI: I have faith in Attorney Davis.
10
                THE COURT: Okay. So I appreciate knowing that and
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    obviously let me know if there's anything that -- that happens.
12
                All right. So what else -- I really would like to
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    try not to spend -- I'd like to have a few days where I am not
14
    focusing on court business, if it's at all possible. So while
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    you have me on the line now, is there anything else that you
16
    think I need to be talking to you about before the jury
17
    selection on Tuesday?
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                Anything from the government?
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                MR. DAVIS: No.
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                MS. KRASINSKI: No, your Honor.
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                THE COURT:
                           Anything from the defense?
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                MR. WOLPIN: No.
23
                MR. LEVIN: No, your Honor.
24
                THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I -- I'll tell my
25
    case manager, while I've got you on the line, you and Jen and,
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if necessary, you can ask my law clerk, Samira, anything that these people file, as soon as it comes in, if you think that it's something that could affect the schedule of the trial, then by every means available, text me, try to call me, email me, with an emergency notice. And I will try to check at least once a day to see whether there's anything like that being filed and we will get people on the phone and I will resolve these issues. And -- and, you know, I -- I really do want to try to move ahead.

While we are on the phone, let me address one issue that you're not raising with me right now, but that I -- I wanted to raise with you and that is with respect to the confidential informant.

I questioned the confidential informant and a transcript is going to be prepared of that conversation. As far as I can see, there's nothing in that conversation that cannot be released to the defendant.

Does the government have a view about that?

 $\mbox{MR.}$ LEVIN: We received it already, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Good. Good. Okay. So you -you know what that communication is. Now, there's one thing
there that I wanted to draw to your attention and that is as
far as I could see, the one thing that that witness might have
that was useful to me, there may be other things that are
useful to you, but he did have -- he did recall another person

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who he had a communication with that had a -- again, I don't have the transcript in front of me -- personal familiarity with Cheddar Mane and the use of drugs and I instructed the witness to give that name to the FBI agent. Has -- do you intend to do anything with respect to that information which all of what I've just described and anything I know about it is reflected in that transcript, Mr. Levin? MR. LEVIN: Well, information that we haven't received yet, but we're -- I guess we'll have to discuss that. I think given the time line now, it's unlikely that we're going to be able to do anything with it, but --THE COURT: Well, my -- my strong sense, Mr. Levin, is that because you have available to the -- the chat in the invitation-only group that you have everything that I could nail down that this witness had that bears on Cheddar Mane's use of drugs. And, therefore, it does not seem to me that under Roviaro and the controlling First Circuit precedent that I've previously cited and, unfortunately, again, I don't have it in front of me now, that it seems to me that there -- that I should not order the disclosure of the confidential informant's identity. If you have any different -- any additional -- I mean, you're preserving your argument for purposes of appeal,

but having received the transcript and having reviewed the

transcript, do you have any additional arguments to present to me on that point? Because my inclination is he doesn't know anything that would be potentially useful by way of extrinsic evidence about Cheddar Mane's use of drugs that you don't already have available to you. Do you have a different view on that, having looked over the transcript?

MR. LEVIN: No, we do not, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So you've preserved your argument for purposes of an appeal.

I'll ask my case manager to remind me when I get back to memorialize this and explain it further on the record either on the day of jury selection or at some other point during the trial because I don't have the case law in front of me now and I don't want to make a fully explained ruling.

But so that the parties know for purposes of their preparation, it's my judgment after questioning the witness under oath that the witness does not have any information about Cheddar Mane's use of drugs that would be useful to the government by way of extrinsic evidence to show Cheddar Mane's bias that — that which the defendant already has available to it because they have access to the records of the communications in the Telegram group which was the principal source of the informant's knowledge about drug use by Cheddar Mane. And, therefore, under the existing precedent, the disclosure of the informant's identity should not be required

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     and I do not intend to order it to be produced.
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                And I'll provide a -- a more detailed oral ruling on
     that during the course of the trial and I'll just ask my case
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 4
    manager to remind me of that when the time comes.
                Okay.
                       Is there anything else anyone wants to say to
 6
    me on any other subject?
 7
                MR. LEVIN: No, your Honor. Enjoy your vacation.
                THE COURT:
                            Thanks.
                                     What's left it, because I've
 8
    given up the -- all day Tuesday and Wednesday of it for the
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     trial. So I've got a couple days anyways, but I thank you.
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     appreciate that.
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                And, Ms. Krasinski, I really do hope things turn out
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    well for you and I fully understand the -- the need that you
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    have to do what you need to do and you should do it. And,
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     fortunately, we have Mr. Davis here and whatever happens, I'm
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     completely comfortable even if necessary he could do the whole
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     trial by himself. So do what you need to do and we'll work
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     around that. All right?
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                Thank you. That -- that concludes our -- that
     concludes our hearing and I'll see everybody on Tuesday.
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21
                MR. LEVIN:
                            Thank you, your Honor.
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                (Proceedings concluded at 3:54 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

I, Liza W. Dubois, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate transcription of the within proceedings, to the best of my knowledge, skill, ability and belief.

Submitted: 5/12/21 /s/ Liza W. Dubois
LIZA W. DUBOIS, RMR, CRR